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Abstract 
The article introduces and summarizes the key questions and findings of this special issue of 
Global Policy on the role of domestic and international institutions in the study of Global Value 
Chains (GVCs). The article starts by briefly introducing the concept of GVCs and the state-of-the-
art of the existing literature focusing on the political implications of these landmark changes in the 
global economy. Then we make a case for grounding this emerging literature more strongly into 
an “institutionalist” perspective. More specifically, we argue that while a great deal of attention 
has been paid to intra-chain governance modes – i.e. the different ways in which firms organize 
their cross-border production arrangements – the role external institutional forces play in 
structuring chain dynamics remains surprisingly under-researched. These observations invite an 
analytical perspective that brings institutions back into the study of GVCs. The contributions to 
the special issue focus on multiple causal pathways linking GVCs and various types of domestic- 
and international institutions. Altogether, these contributions underscore that the politics 
engendered by GVCs, as well as how they evolve, can only be fully understood by paying attention 
to the external institutional context in which they are embedded.  
 
Policy implications 
 Political decisions about domestic and international institutions – be it their creation, 
strengthening or weakening – have crucial implications for for how firms organize 
production and distribution within GVCs. The stakeholders involved in policy debates 
about the reversal of regional trade integration in the EU (Brexit) and North America 
(renegotiating NAFTA), should pay greater attention to these long-term dynamics.  
 Particular configurations of domestic institutions can enable countries to maintain and even 
expand output and employment in the manufacturing sector, even when these firms are 
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highly integrated in GVCs. Policy debates about the reform of domestic systems of interest-
intermediation or labor market institutions cannot neglect the systematic effects these 
factors have on firms’ foreign investment choices, and on the resulting effects on patterns 
of domestic production and employment.  
 While private standards and codes of conduct are often hailed as potential ways to govern 
GVCs, they either play a minor or prove ineffective in many instances because of the lack 
of the necessary support of public actors. GVC-related standard-setting initiatives are more 
likely to be effective when devised through multi-stakeholders processes envisaging an 
active role for both private and public actors.   
 GVCs can activate relevant societal actors (i.e., Multinational Corporations) that have an 
interest fostering greater global economic integration and in upholding the international 
institutions that support it (i.e., the World Trade Organization), even in the face of 
reluctance from their own political leaders and rising popular protectionist sentiments. 
Policy debates about the appropriate degree of global economic integration in the coming 
years are likely to be defined by a confrontation between coalitions of actors operating 







The globalization of trade, production, and distribution systems stands out as one of the most 
important developments in the contemporary international economy (Antras 2010). Until the 
1990s, most retailers and producers in advanced capitalist economies bought or produced the bulk 
of their products and inputs domestically. However, the growth of the industrial capabilities of a 
number of important developing countries enabled such producers to cut costs and streamline 
production by outsourcing their labour-intensive, less value-added operations to low(er) income 
countries while at the same time retaining core competencies such as innovation and product 
strategy, marketing, and the highest value-added segments of manufacturing and services (Elms 
and Low 2013; OECD et al. 2013; Lanz and Miroudot 2011).  
 
These transformations have contributed to changing the nature of international economic 
exchanges. Today, trade in intermediates accounts for over two-thirds of total imports for the 
majority of OECD countries (Johnson and Noguera 2012). Moreover, it is estimated that more 
than 80% of merchandise exports and imports of pivotal international economic players now takes 
place within global networks of production and distribution (see Bernard et al. 2009 for data on 
the US). As a result, many goods (and increasingly also services) are no longer being produced in 
a certain country but are “made in the world” and it is now widely accepted that these changing 
patterns of trade, production and distribution crucially affect countries at all income and 
development levels (Taglioni and Winkler 2014). Unsurprisingly, shedding light on the political 
economy that drives- and is engendered by these transformations has been identified as one of the 
key challenges for scholars in the field of International Political economy (IPE) (Neilson et al. 
2014).  
 
The Global Value Chains (GVCs) framework has emerged in recent years as a promising 
conceptual tool around which systematic thinking on these phenomena can be developed, 
capturing the interconnectedness of such increasingly geographically dispersed patterns of trade 
and production across the globe (De Backer and Miroudot 2014; Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 
2011; Gereffi et al. 2005; Neilson et al. 2014). Since the term GVCs was first coined, a promising 
research programme has developed. For one, the GVCs framework spurred a wide array of large-
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scale data gathering and analysis projects, often initiated by international organizations, aimed at 
a) capturing the interconnectedness of economies and shifting patterns of trade and production 
across the globe (see e.g. OECD-WTO 2015; Timmer et al. 2015); and b) studying  the economic 
impact of GVCs (Taglioni and Winkler 2014; Saito et al. 2013). In addition, the GVCs framework 
triggered much work by economists, who have gone a long way in describing the phenomenon of 
GVCs and its implications for the dynamics of global economic competition and, in particular, 
which firms control and coordinate production and trade activities in the world economy (Gereffi 
1999; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Sturgeon et al. 2008). Over time, scholars working in this 
field have also drawn attention to the social, cultural and political dimensions of these 
transformations (Levy, 2008). While also focusing on on-going changes in the material economic 
processes of production, distribution and consumption, this body of scholarly work devotes ample 
attention to the role of non-chain factors and to how power relations among different sets of actors 
shape the structure and organization of global production (Coe et al. 2008: 280).1 
 
Altogether, these works have gone a long way in developing the appropriate analytical tools to 
capture and explain on-going changes in the global economy centered on industrial 
transformations constructed within system-wide dynamics of coordination and control by 
economic and non-economic actors (Neilson et al. 2014). And, perhaps most importantly, this 
body of work has been able to shed light on these transformations’ far-reaching implications, both 
for foreign economic policymaking and for the international economic system at large. For 
instance, studies focusing on these changing patterns of production and distribution have shown 
how they contribute to systematically decreasing demands for protectionist policies (Baccini et al. 
2017; Osgood 2017), including during economic crises (Baccini and Kim 2012; Gawande et al. 
2015), thereby reducing political support for the imposition of anti-dumping measures (Eckhardt 
2015; Jensen et al. 2015), and promoting support for trade liberalization through Preferential Trade 
Agreements (PTAs) (Antras and Staiger 2012; Baldwin 2011; Chase 2003; Manger 2009). In 
addition, these works have shed light on the new challenges and opportunities that firms and 
governments in developing countries face in this new global political economy (Barrientos et al. 
2011; Gereffi and Frederick 2010; Henderson et al. 2002; Phillips and Sakamoto 2012). 
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Notwithstanding the relevance and quality of these contributions, our understanding of GVCs 
remains far from comprehensive. In particular, strikingly little attention has been paid to systematic 
theorizing about- and presenting comprehensive empirical evidence on the multiple causal 
mechanisms connecting (national-, regional and international) institutions and GVCs. This is 
surprising, as early work on global commodity chains (GCCs), as GVCs were first called, focused 
mainly on the role of (state) institutions in shaping global production. For instance, in their seminal 
contributions, Hopkins and Wallerstein’s (1977; 1986) show how states can exercise power within 
GCCs in large part in the form of tariffs and rules of origin. In Gereffi’s revision (1994) of the 
GCC concept, attention shifted to firm strategies and actions, yet he too emphasized the pivotal 
role of “state policies in global commodity chains” (pp. 100-101). In his framework, Gereffi (1994) 
laid out four key structures that shape GCCs: input-output, geographic, (firm-level) governance, 
and institutional. However, of these four structures, firm level governance has received by far the 
most attention in the GVC research agenda that has developed since then, while institutions have 
disappeared somewhat of the scholarly radar screen. In short, GVC scholars have focused 
primarily on conceptualizing and accounting for different inter-firm governance patterns (Gereffi 
et al. 2005; Nadvi 2008), treating institutions as an external “context” within which firms actions 
take place.  
 
While recent works have paid more attention to how (state) institutions constitute and are 
constituted by GVCs, the central focus of this research agenda has also been almost exclusively 
on existing political dynamics, interactions, and power relations within value chains. As nicely 
argued in a recent contribution by Nielson et al. (2014: 3), while the conceptual prisms of GVCs 
have long prefigured central questions about the role of state institutions, within this literature state 
institutions are rarely placed in the foreground, and even more rarely given due theoretical 
consideration. And this line of reasoning could be easily extended to the role of regional and 
international institutions. Few would doubt that emergence and increasing importance of multiple 
layers of governance "above" the state, more or less formalized, has become a central feature of 
contemporary international relations (Mattli and Woods 2009). Yet, systematic research on the 




To be fair, recently the literature has slowly started to move in this direction. Some recent 
contributions focus on the role of state institutions, analysing, for instance, whether GVCs reduce 
or increase the scope for state action in the domestic economy, and what strategies states can devise 
to support and to capture a better slice of GVCs (Curran 2015; Lee et al. 2014; Mayer et al. 2017; 
Ravenhill 2014; Yeung 2014). Others have explicitly adopted a GVC framework to account for 
otherwise surprising support for trade liberalization, through PTAs (Eckhardt and Poletti 2016).  
While the former set of works shows that domestic institutions can play a role in determining 
where GVC production processes ‘land’ in the world economy, the latter suggests that GVCs may 
have directly bear relevant actors’ propensity to create international institutions. Other authors 
have also started to shed light on how various types of global governance mechanisms affect intra-
value chain dynamics (Nadvi 2008; Posthuma and Rossi 2017). These important works draw 
attention to the need to think much more systematically about the causal mechanisms that connect 
GVCs and the “external” institutional context within which they are embedded.   
 
Institutions and GVCs 
The contributions to this Special Issue systematically address the question how institutions are 
affected by- and shape an international political economy increasingly organized around GVCs. 
To paraphrase a leading scholar in this field of inquiry: our aim is to bring institutions back in the 
study of GVCs (Sturgeon 2008). We define institutions very broadly as sets of formal and informal 
humanly devised constraints that structure economic political and social interactions (North 1990). 
This definition encompasses different types of institutions. On one side of the spectrum, we think 
of institutions as laws, policies, decision-making rules, bureaucratic institutions and governmental 
agencies with a more or less significant organizational standing. On the other side, we think of 
institutions as sets of values, beliefs, norms, and shared meanings that are embedded in particular 
societies. In between these two extremes, we think of institutions as stable patterns, more or less 
formalized, of interactions between societal actors and public officials that structure the ways in 
which societal interests come to be aggregated and channeled in public policy-making and may 
even be instrumental to setting and implementing standards for production based on voluntary 
adherence to common rules, reciprocity and trust  (Abbott and Snidal 2009).  
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While GVCs can, and should, themselves be thought of as institutions, we consider them as two 
analytically distinct categories. Sturgeon (2008) identifies three pillars of GVCs analysis: 1) the 
characters of governance modes of chains, that is with the variation in the ways in which firms 
organize their cross-border production arrangements; 2) how power is distributed and exerted 
among firms and other actors in the chain; and 3) the role external institutional forces play in 
structuring chain dynamics. The analytical distinction between institutions that are internal to the 
chain and those that are external to it is therefore critical to enable disentangling the causal 
mechanisms that exist between GVCs and the external institutional context in which these 
institutionalized forms of inter-firm relations and power struggles are embedded.  
 
The contributions to the special issue focus on both sides of the causal relationship connecting 
institutions and GVCs. One set of contributions concentrates on the dynamics of causation that go 
from institutions to GVCs. These contributions conceive of the organizational and spatial features, 
as well as the dynamics of power distribution and domination within GVCs as, at least partly, 
endogenous to the external institutional environment. These works thus shed light on how external 
institutional forces constrain or enable particular sets of organizational arrangements and power 
struggles within a value chain, but also on how they affect relations between actors located within 
and outside these GVCs. A second set of contributions focuses on the causal mechanisms to go 
from GVCs to institutions. This second set of contributions aims to shed light on how external 
institutions themselves are affected by particular governance configurations and power dynamics 
within GVCs. These works thus analyze instances in which the creation, design, and evolution of 
the external institutional environment can be traced back to the influence of GVCs. The 
contributions to the special investigate these causal channels connecting GVCs and institutions 
located at the national and international levels. As mentioned above, we consider institutions of 
various kinds, ranging from formal institutions in which public actors play a dominant role, to less 
formalized arrangements entailing various configurations of public and private actors’ interactions. 
Against this background, and relying on the distinction between domestic and international 
institutions, we briefly introduce the key questions and findings of this special issue.  
 
Domestic institutions and GVCs 
The question how domestic institutions affect the responses of states to the incentives and 
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constraints brought about the dynamics of international economic exchange has always been 
central in comparative political economy debates (Gourevitch 2002). While there is no space here 
to do justice to richness and quality of this literature, broadly speaking these studies have 
concentrated on how a number of different institutional factors – i.e. types of political systems, 
electoral institutions, and configurations of state-society relations – affect how preferences of 
societal actors are aggregated to produce particular outcomes in domestic policymaking, as well 
as the extent to which states develop particular domestic institutional settings with a view to 
effectively extract resources to provide regulatory and redistributive public goods in the face of 
competitive pressures brought about globalization (Katzenstein 1985; Rogowski 1987; Milner and 
Kubota 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001). The centrality acquired by GVCs in the contemporary world 
economy opens up new opportunities for developing linkages between comparative political 
economy and international economics, with a view to advancing our understanding of how 
domestic institutions filter pressures emanating from GVCs and vice versa.  
 
De Ville’s (2018) contribution to this Special Issue sheds light on this important debate by 
integrating insights from the GVC literature and the so-called Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
literature. Starting from the observation that the domestic institutional arrangements allowing 
firms to deal with their coordination problems vary across countries, the VoC literature contends 
that these different types of domestic “institutional complementarities” – the two ideal types being 
Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) and Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) - critically affect 
how states respond to the incentives and constraints generated by an increasingly globalized 
economy. Against this background, De Ville (2018) investigates whether these domestic 
institutional factors affects the strategies pursued by firms that operate in GVCs. He hypothesizes 
that for firms in CMEs the gains of offshoring are lower while the costs are higher than for firms 
in LMEs and that this will, in turn, result in a different geography of GVCs. De Ville (2018) shows 
the plausibility of this argument by focussing on Germany – with data for the UK and the US as 
benchmarks – and convincingly shows that, although German firms are intensively integrated in 
GVCs, its core sectors have made relatively more use of “nearshoring”, allowing firms to retain 
comparative institutional advantages. As a result, Germany has managed to maintain and even 
expand output and employment in its core industries.  
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Another key debate in the IPE literature concerns the increasingly important role of governance 
arrangements on setting and implementing standards for (global) production in the fields of labour- 
and human rights, as well as sustainability and the environment (Abbott and Snidal 2009; O'Rourke 
2003). Standards are mechanisms by which public or private authorities can regulate and govern 
production and, as such, we see them as another set of institutional arrangements that should be 
included in our discussion on GVCs.  Standards can take several forms: self-regulatory codes by 
companies and/or their trade associations; Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) promoting 
standards for voluntary adoption by companies; or multi-stakeholder organisations in which 
various combinations of firms, NGOs and state actors promote and implement codes of conduct 
for member- and non-member firms (Abbott and Snidal 2009). Until recently there was no explicit 
diaologue between the literature on standards and the GVC literature. Although this is changing 
(Nadvi 2008), the focus of the literature on standards and GVC has mainly focused on the role of- 
and implications for industry actors in setting and adopting private standards (Manning et al. 2008; 
Lee et al 2012).  
 
Two of the contributions to this special issue aim to move the debate on GVCs and standards away 
from a focus on within value chain dynamics and power relations by looking at a broader set of 
actors and wider political struggles around standards. Both contributions do so by focusing 
primarily on domestic standards.  
 
Dermawan and Hospes (2018) highlight the growing importance of standards, as domestic private 
governance initiatives, within GVCs and the resulting power dynamics between state and non-
state actors, through an in-depth analysis of the rise and fall of the Indonesian Palm Oil Pledge 
(IPOP). IPOP was a domestic institutional arrangement of the largest Indonesian palm oil 
producers aimed at zero-deforestation by 2020. At its initiation in 2014, IPOP was lauded as a 
turning point in curbing the negative impact of palm oil expansion on deforestation, yet the 
Indonesian Government dissolved IPOP in 2016. The authors convincingly show that the 
Indonesian Government decided to put an end to the IPOP, less than two years after it was 
launched, because this private business initiative was perceived as a potential threat to its 
sovereignty. The Government successfully framed IPOP as a threat to smallholder development, 
the state’s rulemaking authority, and presented the IPOP as an illegal cartel. The authors argue that 
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there is a need to bring domestic state institutions back into GVC analysis, as the state is bringing 
itself back into GVC governance because it experiences that firm-driven governance of GVCs 
affects their sovereignty over territory, rulemaking, producers and economic organisation. 
 
Heron, Prado and West (2018) on their part also look at domestic private standards as an 
institutional arrangement through which GVCs are governed and regulated. In their contribution, 
the authors aim to overcome the “firm centricity” of existing scholarship, which has looked mainly 
at how private standards are used by powerful retailers to control supply chains, by looking at the 
role of both state- and non-state actors in the rise of such standards and the broader (domestic) 
institutional context in which they emerge. To this end, Heron et al. (2018) carry out in-depth 
analysis of the GVC governance of soy in general and private standards schemes linked to the soy 
GVC in particular. The authors trace the actors that have shaped private certification initiatives 
related to GMO-free soy and deforestation in Brazil and conclude that private standards have 
played a relatively minor (and largely ineffective) role in the governance of soy. They describe 
one Brazilian initiative that has been successful: the ‘Soy Moratorium.’ This voluntary initiative, 
commits the soy industry to avoid buying soy grown on deforested lands and the authors show that 
the initiative’s success is attributable to the ability of a few relevant actors to exert control on the 
process, the simplicity of the compliance requirements, and the active support of the Brazilian 
government.  
 
International institutions and GVCs 
The remaining contributions focus on the causal highlight various causal mechanisms linking 
GVCs and institutions located “above” states. Economic policy-making increasingly takes place 
within a complex, multilateral context, consisting of bilateral, regional, and global institutions, 
which vary widely both in terms of their degree of bindingness and with respect to their 
composition. The literatures on “legalization” (Abbott et al. 2000) or on the rational design of 
institutions (Koremenos et al. 2001) have widely investigated the first dimension, while studies on 
the emergence of complex and hybrid forms of governance encompassing different configurations 
of public-private actors’ relations have shed light the second (Eberlein et al. 2014; Mattli and 
Snidal 2009). The contributions to this special issue seek to advance the debate by investigating 
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the causal links connecting GVCs and international institutions varying along the three dimensions 
of geographical scope, degree of legalization, and type of governance.  
 
Looking at the causal dynamics going from GVCs to international institutions, one contribution 
focuses on how GVCs affect the performance of a global, and highly legalized institutions such as 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). The World Trade Organization (WTO) stands out as a 
prime example of strong legalization and delegation of authority in international politics (De 
Bièvre et al. 2014). The functioning of a governance system which regulates over € 23 trillion in 
trade in goods and services on a yearly basis, ultimately depends on its judicial arm’s ability to 
prevent opportunistic behavior by its members, and on its ability to restore compliance when these 
are found to violate WTO rules (). Unsurprisingly, the politics of WTO compliance has attracted 
a great deal of attention (for a review of this literature see Poletti and De Bièvre 2016). However, 
and quite surprisingly, we know very little about how the performance of the crucial institutional 
of the post-WWII liberal international order is affected by GVCs. The contribution by Yildirim et 
al. (2018) helps filling this gap by showing that decision-makers are more likely to try and 
eliminate barriers to cross-border trade by tabling WTO complaints when facing pressures by firms 
and sectors highly integrated into GVCs. In particular, the contribution shows that whenever a 
potential WTO dispute touches upon the interests of Multinational Corporations, policymakers in 
complainant countries can expect these firms affiliates in defendant WTO members to contribute 
to a political climate that is more conducive to compliance. This finding has important implications 
for the current debate about the continued centrality of the WTO, particularly in light of anti-WTO 
rhetoric of the current US administration, as well as its blatant attempts to undermine its 
functioning and legitimacy. Indeed, this analysis suggests that GVCs activate relevant societal 
actors (i.e., MNCs) that have an interest uphold existing multilateral trade commitments even in 
the face of reluctance from their own political leaders. 
 
Two additional contributions look into the causal mechanisms linking GVCs and bilateral or 
regional international institutions such as PTAs. GVCs have been widely shown to stimulate PTAs. 
For one, firms integrated in GVCs are increasingly reliant on imports of intermediate inputs. This 
changes the balance of domestic trade-related interests by increasing the domestic coalition of 
firms favoring trade liberalization. While traditionally seen as a battle between firms exporting in 
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foreign markets, i.e. firms in export oriented sectors, and firms fearing competition from foreign 
producers, i.e. firms in import-competing sectors, GVCs make import-dependent firms more 
important in the domestic political economy and thus stimulate support for PTAs (Eckhardt and 
Poletti 2016; Manger 2009). In addition, GVCs create incentives for greater regulatory 
harmonization, generating a demand for PTAs that are broader in scope (Baldwin 2011).  
 
Baccini and Dür (2018) contribute to this debate by showing for the first time how GVCs interact 
with Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) to produce particular preferences and outcomes with regards to 
PTAs. More specifically, contrary to the shared view that GVCs should always make trade 
liberalization easier, this contribution demonstrates that GVCs, i.e. trade in intermediate goods, in 
the presence of IIT, i.e. trade in differentiated products make trade liberalization less appealing 
and, therefore less likely. Baccini and Dür (2018) empirically corroborate this argument by 
showing that the combination of GVCs and IIT incentivizes firms to lobby alone rather than via 
encompassing trade organizations, and leads to lower tariff cuts in PTAs. This finding has 
important implications because it casts doubts on the widely held view that GVCs should always 
give rise to deep and ambitious trade agreements. As the paper shows, the combination of GVCs 
and IIT may actually decrease the depth of institutionalized international cooperative 
arrangements, in casu PTAs.  
 
Moreover, Eckhardt and Lee (2018) contribute in another important way to this debate through an 
in-depth case study on the preferences and political strategies of tobacco firms in the context of 
NAFTA negotiations. This contribution shows that while highly productive firms integrated in 
GVCs are generally supportive of PTAs, their preferences over the design of these institutions may 
vary considerably depending on the organization of their value chains at the time of the PTA 
negotiations. More specifically, Eckhardt and Lee (2018) convincingly demonstrate that 
depending on whether firms sourcing the bulk of their inputs from within the PTA area have a 
strong preference for stringent Rules of Origin (ROOs), while firms depending on offshore 
procurement from outside the PTA area are in favor of more lenient ROOs to accommodate their 
foreign sourcing of inputs. This finding has important implications because it underscores that 





The contributions to this Special Issue contribute to shed light on the multiple causal pathways 
linking institutions and GVCs.  As far as the domestic side of this institutional story is concerned, 
the findings of the special issue suggest that the domestic institutional complementarities that 
characterize various types of political-economies, concerns about state sovereignty, and the 
domestic institutional arrangements for standard setting all play a critical role in shaping how 
particular states respond to the incentives and constraints brought about by GVCs. Similarly, the 
contributions focusing on the international institutional dimension also suggest that GVCs are a 
key factor influencing the politics underlying the functioning of a multilateral institution such as 
the WTO, as well as of PTAS. Altogether, these contributions highlight that both the globalization 
of production has far-reaching implications for how domestic and international institutional setups 
evolve and perform their functions, and that global production patterns are themselves crucially 
affected by such national and international institutional incentives and constraints. 
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